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Product Liability: A Two-Year
Survey
by Franklin P. Brannen, Jr.
Marcus Strong
and Sean P. Robinson
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys developments in Georgia product liability law
between June 1, 2017 and May 31, 2019. 1 It covers noteworthy cases
decided during this period by the Georgia Supreme Court, Georgia
Court of Appeals, and the United States district courts located in
Georgia.
II. PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS
A. Design Defect
In Georgia cases where a plaintiff claims that a manufacturer
negligently designed its products, courts use the “risk–utility analysis”
to determine whether a manufacturer is liable for a plaintiff’s injuries. 2
This test

Partner, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A.,
1992); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1996). Member, State Bars of
Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Mississippi.
** Associate, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A.,
2011); Columbia Law School (J.D., 2014). Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar. Member, State Bar
of Georgia.

Associate, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Kentucky (B.A., cum laude, 2014); Georgia State University School of Law (J.D., 2018).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia product liability law during the prior survey period,
see Franklin P. Brannen, Jr., P. Michael Freed, Kristen S. Cawley & Marcus Strong,
Product Liability, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 69 MERCER L. REV. 231 (2017).
2. Banks v. ICI Ams., Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 734, 450 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1994).
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incorporates the concept of “reasonableness,” i.e., whether the
manufacturer acted reasonably in choosing a particular product
design, given the probability and seriousness of the risk posed by the
design, the usefulness of the product in that condition, and the
burden on the manufacturer to take the necessary steps to eliminate
the risk.3

The trier of fact, “in determining whether a product was defectively
designed, . . . may consider evidence establishing that at the time the
product was manufactured, an alternative design would have made the
product safer . . . was a marketable reality and technologically
feasible.”4
In Sheffield v. Conair Corp.,5 the plaintiff filed suit against “Conair
Corporation, alleging that a Conair model heating pad used by” the
plaintiff caused a mattress fire that ultimately resulted in her house
burning down.6 The plaintiff asserted “that Conair manufactured and
sold the subject heating pad in a defective and unreasonably dangerous
condition” because the pad reached such a high temperature it ignited
the plaintiff’s mattress and lacked safety mechanisms to limit the
temperature of the pad.7 The defendant moved “for summary judgment,
which the trial court granted.”8 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that
“the trial court erred because genuine issues of material fact exist[ed]”
regarding the elements of her claims.9
In analyzing the plaintiff’s design defect claim, the Georgia Court of
Appeals cited to the Georgia Supreme Court’s adoption of “the ‘risk–
utility analysis,’ which requires a trier of fact to ‘balanc[e] the risks
inherent in a product design against the utility of the product . . .
designed’ to determine whether a design is defective.” 10 A trier of fact
analyzes “whether the manufacturer acted reasonably in choosing a
particular . . . design, given the probability and seriousness of the risk,”
the usefulness of the product, and the burden on the manufacturer to
eliminate that risk.11 Further, when engaging in this analysis, the trier
of fact looks at several factors, including but not limited to:

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id.
Id. at 736, 450 S.E.2d at 674–75.
348 Ga. App. 6, 821 S.E.2d 93 (2018).
Id. at 6, 821 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 8, 821 S.E.2d at 95.
Id. at 6, 821 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 6–7, 821 S.E.2d at 94.
Id. at 9, 821 S.E.2d at 96 (quoting Banks, 264 Ga. at 735, 450 S.E.2d at 674).
Id.
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[T]he usefulness of the product; the gravity and severity of the
danger posed by the design; the likelihood of that danger; the
avoidability of the danger, i.e., the user’s knowledge of the product,
publicity surrounding the danger, or the efficacy of warnings, as well
as common knowledge and the expectation of danger, and the user’s
ability to avoid danger; the state of the art at the time the product is
manufactured; the manufacturer’s ability to eliminate the danger
without impairing the product’s usefulness or making it too
expensive; and the feasibility of spreading the loss in the price or by
purchasing insurance.12

In conducting this analysis, the court determined at the outset that
apart from the fire itself, the plaintiff failed to put forth any evidence
with which to analyze any of the above risk–utility factors.13 The court
held that the plaintiff failed to produce any evidence sufficient to create
a genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a defective or unreasonably
safe condition in the heating pad. 14 This failure was fatal to the
plaintiff’s claims of negligence and strict liability, and the court
affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 15
In Woods v. A.R.E. Accessories,16 the Georgia Court of Appeals
reiterated a different aspect of design defect claims: a manufacturer’s
duty to design against harm caused by an unforeseeable product use or
misuse.17
The plaintiff brought a product liability action against the
manufacturer of a pickup truck cap, asserting claims of strict liability
and negligence on the basis that the truck cap was defectively designed.
The plaintiff alleged he suffered a head injury at his place of
employment when the rear hatchback door on a work pickup truck cap
fell on his head as he stood behind the truck bed under the raised door.
After the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
manufacturer, the plaintiff appealed.18
Applying Georgia law on design defect claims, the court of appeals
conducted the risk–utility analysis to determine whether the defendant
carried its burden to show “an absence of any evidence that [the]

12. Id. (quoting Dean v. Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg., 246 Ga. App. 255, 259, 540 S.E.2d
233, 237 (2000)).
13. Id. at 10, 821 S.E.2d at 96.
14. Id. at 10, 821 S.E.2d at 97.
15. Id. at 10–11, 821 S.E.2d at 97.
16. 345 Ga. App. 887, 815 S.E.2d 205 (2018).
17. Id. at 887, 815 S.E.2d at 208.
18. Id. at 887, 815 S.E.2d at 207.
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product as designed [was] defective.”19 The court determined that the
“reasonableness” test, specifically whether the defendant failed to adopt
a reasonable alternative design, applied in this action. 20 The
reasonableness test at the heart of the risk–utility analysis imposes
liability for a design defect only where the manufacturer failed to adopt
a reasonable alternative design that would have reduced foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product.21
The undisputed facts in Woods showed that the truck cap door fell
due to a detached gas strut, which was damaged by the plaintiff’s
employer’s consistent use of a custom truck bed. The plaintiff provided
no evidence to support his claim that the misuse of the truck bed and
truck cap was foreseeable to the manufacturer. 22
Because the record demonstrated that the truck cap fell because of
the plaintiff’s employer’s unforeseeable misuse and the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate otherwise, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s
ruling of summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 23
B. Manufacturing Defect
In Georgia, a manufacturing defect is identified as “a deviation from
some objective standard or a departure from the manufacturer’s
specifications established for the creation of the product.”24 A plaintiff
cannot put forth a mere allegation that a product malfunctioned to
create an issue of disputed material fact as to whether a manufacturing
defect existed when a product left the defendant manufacturer’s control.
Expert testimony is sometimes necessary to make this showing, but
Georgia courts do not always require the plaintiff to produce expert
testimony.25
In O’Shea v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc.,26 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reiterated that the
existence of a manufacturing defect in a product liability case may be
inferred from circumstantial evidence.27 The plaintiff in O’Shea

19. Id. at 890, 815 S.E.2d at 210 (emphasis omitted) (quoting CertainTeed Corp. v.
Fletcher, 300 Ga. 327, 329, 794 S.E.2d 641, 644 (2016)).
20. Id. at 890, 815 S.E.2d at 210 (quoting Jones v. NordicTrack, Inc., 274 Ga. 115,
118, 550 S.E.2d 101, 103 (2001)).
21. Id. at 890, 815 S.E.2d at 209 (citing Jones, 274 Ga. at 118, 550 S.E.2d at 103).
22. Id. at 892, 815 S.E.2d at 211.
23. Id. at 893, 815 S.E.2d at 212.
24. Jones v. Amazing Products, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236 (N.D. Ga. 2002).
25. Williams v. Mast Biosurgery USA, Inc., 644 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2011).
26. 342 F. Supp. 3d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2018).
27. Id. at 1363.
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experienced knee pain seven years after having his knee replaced, and
during diagnosis surgery, discovered the knee implant was broken. The
plaintiff then filed claims of design defect, manufacturing defect, and
failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturers of the implant for
injuries suffered from the device. The defendant moved for summary
judgment and argued that the plaintiff failed to provide expert
testimony showing that the implant did not function as intended, but
merely relied on circumstantial evidence that the implant did not
function as long as intended.28 Among other evidence, the plaintiff
presented a complaint-handling form regarding this incident from the
defendants that affirmatively stated the device malfunctioned or failed
to perform as intended and no other conditions contributed to its
failure.29 The court held that this admission from the defendants
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff’s
knee implant suffered a manufacturing defect.30
Because the plaintiff was able to produce evidence through an
internal complaint-handling form that the device did not operate as
intended, the district court denied the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on the plaintiff’s manufacturing-defect claim.31
III. ELEMENTS
A. Duty of Seller
One of the essential elements in product liability actions claiming
negligence is the existence of a legal duty. To succeed on a negligence
claim, a plaintiff must show the existence of a legal duty, the breach of
that duty, and a causal connection between the alleged conduct and the
plaintiff’s injury.32
In Sheats v. Kroger Co.,33 the plaintiff asserted a claim of ordinary
negligence against Kroger after a grocery store trip where several glass
bottles fell from the bottom of a cardboard package she lifted from a
shelf and broke on the floor, resulting in an injury to the plaintiff’s foot.
The defendant moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s
negligence claim, and asserted that plaintiff failed to show any record
evidence that the package failure was foreseeable to the grocery store.
28. Id. at 1357–59.
29. Id. at 1362.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1363.
32. Wilcher v. Redding Swainsboro Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 563,
565–66, 743 S.E.2d 27, 30 (2013).
33. 342 Ga. App. 723, 805 S.E.2d 121 (2017).
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The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
and the plaintiff appealed.34
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that a material issue of fact remained
with respect to whether the package at issue was defective and the
defendant maintained an unsafe package display. 35 The court assessed
the evidence the plaintiff presented in support of her negligence claim
and determined summary judgment for the defendant was
appropriate.36 While “retailers owe consumers a duty to supply goods
packed by reliable manufacturers . . . without imperfections that may
be discovered by” the dealers in such products, the court reiterated that
retailers who are not manufacturers have no obligation to test an item
purchased and sold in the usual course and trade.37 Where a retailer
lacks knowledge of any danger and nothing calls its attention to such
danger, the retailer is not negligent in failing to exercise care to
determine its existence.38
The court held that the plaintiff failed to present evidence showing
that the defendant had any information that would have put it on
notice of the package failure.39 Additionally, the defendant presented
evidence that any issues with the package were not evident when the
display shelf was stocked and the staff did not observe issues in other
similar packages.40 The court held that absent any record evidence that
the defendant grocery store should have been on notice of a potential
package failure, there was no basis for concluding the defendant owed a
duty, or breached any duty, it owed to the plaintiff. 41 On this basis, the
court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary
judgment to the defendant.42
B. Causation
Proximate cause is an essential element of any product liability
claim.43 This requirement applies regardless of the type of defect the

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 724–25, 805 S.E.2d at 125–26.
Id. at 731, 805 S.E.2d at 129.
Id. at 732, 805 S.E.2d at 130.
Id. at 731, 805 S.E.2d at 130.
Id.
Id. at 732, 805 S.E.2d at 130.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Powell v. Harsco Corp., 209 Ga. App. 348, 350, 433 S.E.2d 608, 610 (1993).
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plaintiff alleges (such as a design defect or manufacturing defect) or the
theory of recovery (such as strict liability or negligence).44
In Sheffield, the Georgia Court of Appeals discussed this causation
element and the burden on plaintiffs to properly demonstrate it.45 After
reviewing the record before them, the court determined that the record
evidence only allowed for an inference that the heating pad caused the
fire.46 But this inference did not extend to the cause of the fire being the
result of a design defect.47 Testimony from the responding fire chief that
he could not say “whether it was more likely than not that a failure of
the heating pad caused the ignition” of the fire was persuasive, and the
court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to
Conair.48
The Georgia Supreme Court in Patterson v. Kevon, LLC49 further
addressed the issue of proximate cause in food poisoning cases. The
plaintiffs asserted claims of negligence, violation of the Georgia Food
Act,50 and product liability claims, specifically alleging that the food at
a wedding rehearsal dinner was defective and negligently prepared by
the defendant. The defendant barbecue caterer moved for summary
judgment, asserting that the plaintiffs could not show that their alleged
food poisoning was proximately caused by the defendant’s food, as the
plaintiffs consumed other food not prepared by defendant at the
rehearsal dinner and the reception the following day. The trial court
granted summary judgment because the plaintiffs could not exclude
every other reasonable hypothesis for the cause of their illness, a ruling
affirmed by the Georgia Court of Appeals. 51
The Georgia Supreme Court determined that, after “[a]n examination
of the evidence presented by the parties,” summary judgment was not
appropriate.52 The court concluded that the defendant’s arguments were
not supported by direct evidence, but rather “circumstantial evidence of
the absence of a causal link between its food and the plaintiff’s
illness.”53 While the defendant presented circumstantial evidence in
opposition, the plaintiff could contradict the defendant’s assertions to

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
348 Ga. App. at 10, 821 S.E.2d at 97.
Id.
Id. at 10–11, 821 S.E.2d at 97.
Id. at 12, 821 S.E.2d at 98.
304 Ga. 232, 818 S.E.2d 575 (2018).
O.C.G.A. §§ 26-2-1–26-2-441 (2019).
Patterson, 304 Ga. at 233–34, 818 S.E.2d at 576–77.
Id. at 236, 818 S.E.2d at 579.
Id. at 236–37, 818 S.E.2d at 579.
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survive summary judgment.54 The court held that plaintiffs in food
poisoning cases have no duty to prove a “special element” of causation
and show that the only reasonable hypothesis for their illness was the
acts or omissions of the defendant.55 Where neither party presented
expert testimony but the plaintiff presented more than general
allegations of illness, the court held that the plaintiff could still
demonstrate evidence of proximate cause. 56
Even though the plaintiff only presented circumstantial evidence,
because the defendant’s circumstantial evidence failed to rebut it, the
court held that summary judgment was not appropriate and reversed
the trial court’s ruling.57
IV. DEFENSES
A. Statute of Limitations
A defendant may move to bar a plaintiff’s claims that are brought
beyond the applicable statute of limitations prescribed by Georgia law. 58
In Georgia, the plaintiff alleging an injury to the person must bring the
action within two years after the right of action accrues.59
The plaintiffs in Collett v. Olympus Optical Co.60 alleged that one of
the plaintiffs became ill after contracting human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV) from a colonoscope improperly disinfected with a
disinfectant manufactured by the defendant. The defendant
manufacturer moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the
plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 61
The defendant asserted that the plaintiffs’ action accrued when the
plaintiffs first tested positive for HIV, but the plaintiffs argued that
their claims did not accrue until years later when they learned that one
plaintiff may have contracted HIV from an infected colonoscope.62
In its analysis, the court reviewed the “discovery rule that applies in
certain tort cases.”63 Specifically, the “cause of action does not accrue so
as to cause the statute of limitations to run until a plaintiff discovers or
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 237, 818 S.E.2d at 579.
Id. at 234–35, 238, 818 S.E.2d at 577, 579.
Id. at 238–40, 818 S.E.2d at 580–81.
Id. at 240, 818 S.E.2d at 581.
O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (2019).
Id.
No. 318-CV-66 (CDL), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208463 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2018).
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *8.
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with reasonable diligence should have discovered that he was
injured.”64 Further, a cause of action will not accrue “until the plaintiff
knew or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the causal connection between the injury and the alleged
negligent conduct of the defendant.”65
In Collett, the plaintiff alleged he “did not suffer an injury until he
contracted HIV” after his colonoscopy, and he and the other plaintiff
“were not able to discover a causal connection between the HIV” and the
colonoscopy until years later despite reasonable diligence.66 Based on
these circumstances, the court found that the discovery rule applied. 67
The court ultimately held that the underlying action involved a
bodily injury that developed over time, and that the plaintiffs’ cause of
action “did not accrue until they discovered ‘or with reasonable
diligence should have discovered that [they were] injured’ and that
there was a ‘causal connection between the injury and alleged negligent
conduct of the defendant.’”68 For these reasons, the plaintiffs’ actions
were brought within the applicable statute of limitations. 69
V. SPOLIATION
Spoliation is a discovery sanction imposed at a trial court’s discretion
when a party destroys or fails to preserve evidence “that is relevant to
‘contemplated or pending litigation.’”70 The severity of the sanction
depends on the spoliating party’s culpability. In severe instances,
sanctions can result in a jury instruction of a rebuttable presumption
that the evidence was adverse to the spoliating party’s interests, the
entry of a default judgement, or case dismissal. 71 Georgia courts have
emphasized that “severe sanctions for spoliation are reserved for
‘exceptional cases’” where a party lost or destroyed material evidence
either intentionally or in bad faith, resulting in incurable prejudice to
the opposing party.72 Before a spoliation sanction may be imposed, the

64. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ballew v. A.H. Robins Co., 688 F.2d 1325, 1327
(11th Cir. 1982)).
65. Id. (citing Ballew, 688 F.2d at 1325).
66. Id. at *12.
67. Id.
68. Id. (quoting Ballew, 688 F.2d at 1327).
69. Id. at *14.
70. Phillips v. Harmon, 297 Ga. 386, 393, 774 S.E.2d 596, 603 (2015) (quoting Silman
v. Assocs. Bellemeade, 286 Ga. 27, 28, 685 S.E.2d 277, 278 (2009)).
71. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Koch, 303 Ga. 336, 339, 812 S.E.2d 256, 261 (2018).
72. Id. at 343, 812 S.E.2d at 263.
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court must find that the allegedly-spoliating party breached their duty
to preserve the evidence.73
The duty to preserve arises when litigation is either pending or
reasonably foreseeable from the perspective of the party in control of
the evidence at issue.74 “Put another way, the duty arises when the
alleged spoliator ‘actually or reasonably should have anticipated
litigation.’”75 Once litigation is pending, foreseeability is typically easy
to discern and the issue turns on the opposing party’s opportunity to
inspect; therefore, most courts are faced with resolving whether
litigation was reasonably foreseeable.76 In Phillips v. Harmon, the
Georgia Supreme Court provided the following non-exhaustive list of
considerations when determining whether litigation was reasonably
foreseeable to the spoliating party: (1) type and extent of injury; (2)
extent that fault for injury is evident; (3) possible financial exposure if
found liable; (4) “the relationship and course of conduct between the
parties, including past litigation or threatened litigation;” (5) “and the
frequency [that] litigation occurs.”77
In Sheats v. Kroger Co., the plaintiff was injured after picking up a
cardboard box containing several glass bottles. The bottom fell out of
the box, causing at least one glass bottle to fall on her foot and the rest
to shatter on the ground around her. The plaintiff initially refused to
turn over the cardboard box to a Kroger employee because she wanted
to keep it as evidence, but eventually handed it over because she was
promised it would be kept for the same purpose. The plaintiff then
informed the store manager that she was going to the hospital for her
injuries.78 The manager then filled out Kroger’s customary three-page
“Customer Incident Report & Investigation Check List” that contained
the following statement on each page: “This report is being prepared in
anticipation of litigation under the direction of legal counsel. It is
confidential and is not to be released to any person unless approved by
legal counsel and authorized by a member of Kroger management with
such authority.”79 Once the form was complete and the manager had
inspected the package, it was recorded for inventory purposes as “lost”
due to breakage and discarded.80

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 339, 812 S.E.2d at 261.
Id.
Id. (quoting Phillips, 297 Ga. at 397, 774 S.E.2d at 605).
Id. at 340, 812 S.E.2d at 261.
Id. at 341, 812 S.E.2d at 261.
Sheats, 342 Ga. App. at 724, 805 S.E.2d at 125.
Id.
Id. at 725, 805 S.E.2d at 126.
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After filing suit, the plaintiff filed a motion for spoliation sanctions
because the package was discarded before she had an opportunity to
inspect it. The trial court denied her motion, reasoning that she failed
to notify Kroger that she was contemplating litigation before the
package was discarded.81 The plaintiff then successfully appealed the
denial of her motion, and the court of appeals vacated the trial court’s
ruling because it “was based on the legally incorrect premise that
Kroger’s duty to preserve the evidence required actual notice of
litigation from Sheats” and remanded the case for reconsideration by
the trial court.82 Because the trial court again denied the plaintiff’s
motion, she appealed on the grounds that a proper application of the
Phillips factors demanded a finding that Kroger had constructive notice
that litigation was reasonably foreseeable. 83
After weighing the five Phillips factors and the confidentiality
statement imprinted on the incident report, the court of appeals held
there was no clear error in the trial court’s decision to again deny the
plaintiff’s motion for spoliation sanctions. 84 First, the type and extent of
the plaintiff’s “injury ‘did not seem to be extensive’ as it was ‘limited to
her big toe.’”85 Second, the manager’s affidavit stated there was no
liquid on the shelf containing the cardboard package that would have
affected the durability of the package and no adjacent packages had
similar problems.86 Accordingly, the evidence supported Kroger’s
argument that it “need not reasonably have anticipated being found at
fault for [her] injury.”87 Third, Kroger was only aware of minimal
financial exposure given the plaintiff’s initial $2,500 in medical costs
and $200 in lost wages. It was not until after the package was discarded
that Kroger learned that the plaintiff suffered a blood clot in her toe
that required surgery, her toenail failed to grow back, and she
continued experiencing pain for months. 88 Fourth, it was undisputed
that there was no course of conduct between the parties, including no
past or threatened litigation.89 Fifth, the manager’s affidavit stated that
he had not previously seen a package failure for this product, which the

81. Id.
82. Id. at 725–26, 805 S.E.2d at 126 (quoting Sheats, 336 Ga. App. at 311, 784 S.E.2d
at 446).
83. Id. at 726, 805 S.E.2d at 126.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 727, 805 S.E.2d at 127.
86. Id. at 728, 805 S.E.2d at 128.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 729, 805 S.E.2d at 128.
89. Id.
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court concluded was sufficient evidence to determine that there was
little, if any, frequency of similar litigation.90 And finally, the court
determined the confidentiality statement indicating the incident report
was prepared in anticipation of litigation was not dispositive. 91 By
producing that report in discovery, Kroger effectively demonstrated that
it was prepared in the regular course of business rather than as
privileged work product.92 The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument
that Kroger should be held to the statement because such a strict
application “would require courts to ignore the Phillips [c]ourt’s
instruction that multiple factors may be considered in determining
whether litigation was reasonably foreseeable.” 93 In balancing the
Phillips factors and incident report, the court determined that the
pre-printed language on the incident report did not outweigh the factors
favoring Kroger.94 Thus, the court held that Kroger’s routine incident
investigation was insufficient to put them on notice that litigation was
reasonably foreseeable.95
In Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. Koch,96 the Georgia Supreme
Court was asked to determine the proper “legal standard for when a
plaintiff’s duty to preserve evidence begins,” because previous decisions
only focused on the defendant’s duty. 97 On April 24, 2012, Mr. Koch was
traveling on Interstate 16 when the tread on his left rear tire detached,
causing his vehicle to swerve out of control and strike a guardrail.
About a month and a half later, Mr. Koch died from his severe injuries,
and his wife eventually brought a product liability action for damages
against Cooper Tire & Rubber Company. Between the time of the
accident and Mr. Koch’s death, the plaintiff spoke to the owner of the
wrecker service, Mr. Brown, and explained to him that she could not
afford the daily storage fee she was being charged for her husband’s
totaled vehicle. The plaintiff agreed to transfer the title to Mr. Brown in
lieu of paying the daily storage charge and instructed Mr. Brown to
save the tires at some point prior to transferring the title. Mr. Brown
only saved the sidewall portion of the tire that attached to the rim, and

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 729, 805 S.E.2d at 128–29.
Id. at 729–30, 805 S.E.2d at 129.
Id. at 730, 805 S.E.2d at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id.
303 Ga. 336, 812 S.E.2d 256 (2018).
Id. at 336, 812 S.E.2d at 258.
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the remainder of the tires and vehicle were scrapped. By the time the
plaintiff retained counsel, the evidence had already been destroyed.98
The Georgia Supreme Court answered the question presented by
stating that “the duty is defined the same for plaintiffs and defendants,
and regardless of whether the party is an individual, corporation,
government, or other entity.”99 The difference between the duty
imposed on the plaintiff and defendant, however, lies in the practical
application for the circumstances of each case.100 Thus, “the duty often
will not arise at the same moment for the plaintiff and the defendant,
because of their differing circumstances.” 101 The court expounded upon
the Phillips factors, explaining that those factors may not be
appropriate in every case, and consideration should also be given to the
spoliating party’s sophistication and experience in litigation. 102 Thus,
trial courts should exercise their duly authorized broad discretion when
evaluating if litigation was reasonably foreseeable, for both plaintiffs
and defendants.103
Turning to the instant case, the supreme court ruled there was no
error in the trial court’s determination that the plaintiff was not yet
under a duty to preserve the tires that were destroyed by the wrecker
service.104 The plaintiff’s husband did not give a reason to preserve the
tires, much less specify that a defect could potentially be used in future
litigation.105 The court also reasoned that the plaintiff’s legitimate
reasons—the vehicle was totaled and had no collision insurance; the
plaintiff was not investigating the crash at the time; counsel had yet to
be contacted; no mention of contemplated litigation had been made; and
the focus was on Mr. Koch’s health—all factored into their decision.106
Cooper Tire argued that spoliation prejudiced its ability to defend
against the plaintiff’s claims; however, that argument was rejected
because the plaintiff was also prejudiced as the party with the burden
of proof.107 Though no sanctions were imposed, the court explained that

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at 336–37, 337 n.2, 812 S.E.2d 258–59, 259 n.2.
Id. at 340, 812 S.E.2d at 261.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 342, 812 S.E.2d at 262.
Id. at 342, 812 S.E.2d at 263.
Id. at 343, 812 S.E.2d at 263.
Id. at 344, 812 S.E.2d at 264.
Id. at 345, 812 S.E.2d at 264.
Id. at 346, 812 S.E.2d at 265.
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Cooper Tire would still be permitted to present the circumstances of the
tire’s destruction as a part of their defense at trial. 108
VI. EXPERT TESTIMONY—THE DAUBERT STANDARD
A “Daubert motion” is an attempt to exclude the testimony of expert
witnesses. The name comes from the landmark United States Supreme
Court case, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,109 where the
Supreme Court instructed trial courts to act in “a gatekeeping role” to
ensure that proposed expert testimony was relevant and reliable. 110 In
2005, the legislature codified the Daubert standard into Georgia law,
permitting state courts to rely on federal opinions that interpreted and
applied this evidentiary standard.111 O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702112 governs the
admissibility of expert testimony and provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if: (1) The testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data; (2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (3) The witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case which have been or will be
admitted into evidence before the trier of fact.113

To fulfill its gatekeeper obligations, the trial court must take into
consideration three distinct aspects of an expert’s testimony: “(a) the
qualifications of the expert; (b) the reliability of the testimony; and (c)
the relevance of the testimony.” 114 Generally, when reliability is at
issue,

108. Id. at 347, 812 S.E.2d at 266.
109. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
110. Id. at 597.
111. Ga. S. Bill 3, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1, § 7(f) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702
(2019)). O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(f) permits Georgia courts to
draw from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137
(1999); and other cases in federal courts applying the standards announced by
the United States Supreme Court in these cases.
O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(f) (2019).
112. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702 (2019).
113. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(b) (2019).
114. Cash v. LG Elecs, Inc., 342 Ga. App. 735, 737, 804 S.E.2d 713, 715 (2017) (citing
Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight, 299 Ga. 286, 289, 788 S.E.2d 421, 424 (2016)).
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[r]eliability is examined through consideration of many factors,
including whether a theory or technique can be tested, whether it has
been subjected to peer review and publication, the known or potential
rate of error for the theory or technique, the general degree of
acceptance in the relevant scientific or professional community, and
the expert’s range of experience and training.115

These reliability factors are “flexible” considerations and not an
exhaustive list.116 The fact that the trial court may view an expert’s
opinion as not “particularly strong” is insufficient to exclude an expert
that is otherwise sufficient. That is an issue for the jury to consider
because it goes to weight, not admissibility. 117
In Cash v. LG Electronics, Inc.,118 the plaintiff was alerted one
morning by her son that the living room television was on fire. Her
house eventually burned to the ground, killing her husband and son.
The fire department was unable to determine the origin of the fire and
could only point to the “vicinity of the entertainment center” as the
source.119 As a result, the plaintiff filed a product liability action and
hired a causation expert who attempted to recreate the subject
incident.120 The expert “opined that an internal component in the
television’s power supply board failed due to a manufacturing defect or
mechanical damage, triggering a chain reaction that caused a fire.” 121
Focusing solely on the reliability of the expert’s testimony, the trial
court granted LG’s Daubert motion on the grounds that the expert’s
methods were unreliable and testimony was not based on sufficient
facts and data.122
The Georgia Court of Appeals later upheld the trial court’s decision,
also only focusing on the reliability of the expert’s testimony. 123 The
court pinpointed the expert’s problematic methodology, noting that
courts should not “admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing
data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that
there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the

115.
(2010).
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

HNTB Ga., Inc. v. Hamilton-King, 287 Ga. 641, 642, 697 S.E.2d 770, 772–73
Cash, 342 Ga. App. at 737, 804 S.E.2d at 715.
Id. at 737, 804 S.E.2d at 715–16.
342 Ga. App. 735, 804 S.E.2d 713 (2017).
Id. at 736, 804 S.E.2d at 714.
Id. at 735–36, 804 S.E.2d at 714–15.
Id. at 736, 804 S.E.2d at 715.
Id. at 735–37, 804 S.E.2d at 714–15.
Id. at 737, 804 S.E.2d at 715.
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opinion proffered.”124 The expert’s principles and methodology involved
a protocol to reverse-engineer the fire’s origin. Yet, he repeatedly
manipulated each stage of the process to prove his hypothesis. At each
phase, his experiment failed to produce his desired result, and he was
only able to progress through the experiment by forcing the results.
Unsurprisingly, the expert was unable to establish that his
methodology had been peer-reviewed, previously used by anyone, had
otherwise been generally accepted by the scientific community, and
could not name any publication that supported his methodology. 125
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding that the
expert’s unreliable methodology was inconsistent with the Daubert
standard.126
In Vazquez v. Raymond Corp.,127 the plaintiff brought a product
liability action to recover for injuries he sustained as a warehouse
worker while operating a forklift. Specifically, the plaintiff asserted
design defect and manufacturing defect claims against Raymond.128 The
defendant filed two Daubert motions with different results worth
discussing: one to exclude Dr. Hunt’s testimony because they contended
he lacked necessary qualifications and his opinions were unreliable, and
the second to exclude Mr. Berry’s testimony because he “lack[ed] the
appropriate qualifications and industry experience to render opinions
on forklift design;” his opinions were not supported by reliable scientific
methodology; and “his opinions [were] almost universally rejected by
the . . . scientific community.”129
The court found that Dr. Hunt’s educational and professional
background rendered him generally qualified to testify as a warnings
and human factors expert.130 The problem, however, was his lack of
qualifications to opine as to design defects related to forklifts. The
record indicated that Dr. Hunt had no training, education, or
experience in forklift design or any similar products: he had never
designed any forklift or individual forklift component, had not
previously worked with or for forklift manufacturers, and had done no
independent work related to forklift design. 131 Thus, the court found he

124. Id. at 737, 804 S.E.2d at 716 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997)).
125. Id. at 739–40, 804 S.E.2d at 716–17.
126. Id. at 740, 742, 804 S.E.2d at 717–18.
127. No. 2:17-CV-20-RWS, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5355 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2019).
128. Id. at *1–3.
129. Id. at *4, *10.
130. Id. at *6.
131. Id. at *6–7.

[12] PRODUCT LIABILITY-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

PRODUCT LIABILITY

11/26/2019 11:15 AM

239

was unqualified to provide an opinion on forklift design defects and
accident reconstruction connected therewith.132
In contrast, the court found Mr. Berry was qualified to offer the
opinions he reached.133 Mr. Berry’s background included undergraduate
and graduate degrees in mechanical engineering, more than two
hundred forklift injury investigations, reviews of thousands of accident
reports from various forklift manufacturers, state agencies, and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and previous research
and analysis that was the subject of peer-reviewed papers he personally
presented to the American Society of Mechanical Engineers.134
In Anderson v. FCA U.S., LLC,135 the plaintiff lost control of his Jeep
Wrangler and hit a rock wall, causing the vehicle to become airborne
and ultimately roll onto the driver’s side. The driver later passed away
from his injuries, and his parents brought suit on his behalf asserting
several product liability claims, namely that the Jeep’s fuel tank was
inadequately guarded. The defendant moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the plaintiffs’ design expert, Mr. Hannemann, should
be excluded, thus eliminating the evidence necessary for the plaintiffs
to carry the case. The plaintiffs similarly filed a Daubert motion to
preclude the defendant’s accident reconstruction expert, Mr. Toomey,
from testifying about specific data.136
The court partially denied the defendant’s motion and permitted Mr.
Hannemann to provide testimony regarding his defective design
theory.137 Mr. Hannemann’s theory opined that the Jeep’s skid plate,
which protected the fuel tank, was defectively designed because it did
not completely cover the fuel tank and left it susceptible to puncture.
The defendant argued that his opinion was unreliable because he had
not tested his opinion and his testimony was no more than speculation
and ipse dixit.138 Reviewing applicable case law, the court noted that it
is not surprising to see a design expert’s opinion that was not tested in

132. Id. at *7.
133. Id. at *10–11.
134. Id. at *11.
135. No. 5:16-CV-558 (MTT), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27158 (M.D. Ga. Feb. 21, 2019).
136. Id. at *2–5. The Jeep was designed and manufactured by Daimler Chrysler
Corporation who, along with twenty-four of its affiliates, filed for voluntary Chapter 11
Bankruptcy. “In the bankruptcy case, Chrysler entered into a court-approved master
transaction agreement (MTA), in which FCA purchased substantially all of the debtors’
assets and assumed certain of their liabilities,” including product liability claims. Id. at
*2–3.
137. Id. at *14.
138. Id. at *10–12; see also Cash, 324 Ga. App. at 737, 804 S.E.2d at 716 for a
discussion of ipse dixit.
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practice because, like experience-based experts, there is no requirement
to do so.139 The court explained that some expert testimony does not fit
squarely within Daubert’s standards; thus, experience and knowledge
may provide a sufficient basis to form an opinion.140 After reviewing
Hannemann’s nearly thirty years of experience in seemingly all aspects
of vehicle design and safety analysis, the court concluded that he should
be permitted to testify regarding his design theory.141 As for the
defendant’s ipse dixit argument, the court rejected it on the grounds
that Hannemann’s opinion was backed by experience and not some
“believe it solely because I said it” foundation.142
Turning to the defendant’s accident reconstruction expert, Toomey,
the court granted the plaintiffs’ Daubert motion to exclude Toomey’s
testimony regarding certain data because it was unreliable. 143
According to Toomey’s opinion, he relied on data from National
Automotive Sampling System/Crashworthiness (NASS) to opine that
the subject incident was “more severe than ninety-nine percent of all
frontal impact crashes.”144 The court found that the NASS data was not
used to support any of Toomey’s opinions, and the defendant
acknowledged the NASS data was simply to “put in perspective the
impact” at their motion hearing.145 Because Toomey did not use the
data for its appropriate purpose, that testimony was excluded as
irrelevant to any legitimate issue.146

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Anderson, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27158, at *12.
Id. at *12–13.
Id. at *13–14.
Id. at *14.
Id. at *17–18.
Id. at *14–15.
Id. at *17.
Id.

